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THE GOVERNMENTAL COMPOSITION OF THE




The estimated health risks from smoking have significant external financial con-
sequences for society. Studies at the national level indicate that cigarettes are self-
financing since external costs such as those due to illnesses are offset by cost sav-
ings associated with premature death, chiefly pension costs. This paper extends this
analysis to all 50 states and considers the costs considered in the state attorneys
general suits against the cigarette industry. Cigarettes are always self-financing
from the standpoint of costs to each state. The extent of the cost savings is less than
at the federal level. However, smokers' higher medical costs are outweighed by
reduced nursing home expenditures, lower pension costs, and excise taxes, where
each of these factors alone usually exceeds the medical cost effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE social costs of cigarette smoking became a major political issue in
the 1990s. In part because of the declining political influence of the smok-
ing population and increased scientific evidence on the hazards of environ-
mental tobacco smoke (ETS), a flurry of public efforts have restricted
smoking in a variety of ways. These policies have included local antismok-
ing ordinances, proposed Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) regulations of smoking at the workplace, and Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) regulations to restrict sales of cigarettes to minors. In
conjunction with the 1994 Clinton health plan initiative, a variety of pro-
posals also sought to raise the federal cigarette tax to as much as $2 per
pack. Since that time, several states have raised cigarette taxes.
Potentially the most costly anti-cigarette-industry effort was the series of
lawsuits filed by the states. Over 40 states filed lawsuits attempting to re-
coup what they claim are increased health care costs that cigarette smoking
* Robert Scharff and Jahn Hakes provided superb assistance. I served as a litigation expert
for the industry on risk awareness issues but not on the damages calculations. This research
was supported by the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund and the Harvard Law School Olin Cen-
ter for Law, Business, and Economics.
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLII (October 1999)]
© 1999 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/1999/4202-0001$01.50
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imposes on their state budgets.' In his 1999 State of the Union address,
President Clinton indicated that the federal government would file a similar
suit. Moreover, he proposed an additional $.55 per pack cigarette tax. To
the extent that cigarette smoking adversely affects health, there will be
higher health insurance costs, including higher costs borne by the states,
which share in the costs of Medicaid and other health programs.
Smoking is potentially risky and has expected adverse health effects. Al-
though there is likely to be such a cigarette-health cost linkage, cigarettes
have other financial consequences as well. The focus in the economics liter-
ature has been broader than on medical costs alone. By considering other
financial effects, such as pension costs, the consensus in the economics lit-
erature has been that cigarettes on balance are self-financing for the country
in terms of their insurance consequences.2 Other studies have assessed some
of the broader benefits of the tobacco industry to the economy and have
found them to be favorable as well.3 All previous studies of the financial
externalities have focused on the national economic effects, not on the ef-
fect on the particular states. Many of the cost savings, such as reduced So-
cial Security costs, are to the federal government. The states could poten-
tially be net losers. Moreover, the distribution of the costs and the excise
taxes on cigarettes is not uniform, so some states may lose financially while
others gain. Consequently, one cannot necessarily conclude from the evi-
dence in the literature that the states are not adversely affected financially
by cigarettes.
Whether the legal focus should be on the state-specific effects or the na-
tional consequences is a different matter. Moreover, the extent to which the
courts will conclude that the states have incurred costs associated with ciga-
rette smoking may depend in part upon which cost components the courts
Among the states that filed these suits are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Sev-
eral cities have filed suits as well, as have Puerto Rico, Guam, the Marshall Islands, and
other government entities. Seven tribal suits and five taxpayer suits have also been filed. A
detailed review appears in Significant Events in Fight against Tobacco, Seattle Times, June
18, 1998, at A22.
2 For examples of these studies, see John B. Shoven, Jeffrey 0. Sundberg, & John P. Bun-
ker, The Social Security Cost of Smoking, in The Economics of Aging 231 (David A. Wise
ed. 1989); Willard G. Manning et al., The Costs of Poor Health Habits (1991); Jane Grav-
elle & Dennis Zimmerman, Cigarette Taxes to Fund Healthcare Reform: An Economic Anal-
ysis (1994); and W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smok-
ing, 9 Tax Pol'y & Econ. 51 (James M. Poterba ed. 1995). The self-financing property hinges
on the discount rate, but for reasonable real rates of return cigarettes are self-financing for
the economy as a whole.
' For the most comprehensive analysis of this type, see Robert D. Tollison & Richard E.
Wagner, Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking, and Public Policy (1988).
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recognize in calculating the damages amount. Cigarette smoking increases
costs associated with health care, but it also decreases nursing home and
pension costs because smoking leads to earlier mortality. Cigarette sales are
accompanied by excise taxes as well, which may offset the health insurance
costs generated. Here I will explore these various cost components for the
states as well as for the federal government to assess the state-specific dis-
tribution of the insurance consequences of cigarettes.
This article principally extends previous work by the author4 to derive
state-federal breakdowns of the social costs of smoking, including a state-
specific analysis of the costs. Section II provides an overview of the legal
and regulatory actions against the cigarette industry and discusses the basis
of the state claims. Section III introduces the externality issues involved and
the distinction between the approach taken in this analysis as opposed to
previous studies. Section IV presents the national social consequences esti-
mates as a reference point and then extends these results to the state of Mis-
sissippi. This case study serves as a useful starting point for illustrating the
methodology, particularly since Mississippi took the lead in filing lawsuits
against the cigarette industry. Section V assesses the state-federal break-
down of the insurance costs of cigarettes more generally and presents esti-
mates of the financial consequences of cigarette smoking for each of the 50
states. Section VI concludes the paper. Overall, the financial calculus sug-
gests that the states do not fare as well as does the federal government.
However, the states profit from cigarettes based on a variety of different
perspectives on the net financial consequences.
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
There have been a myriad of legal and regulatory actions against ciga-
rettes in the 1990s, but by far the most significant are the lawsuits filed by
the state attorneys general. In this article I will restrict my focus to the set
of costs considered in these suits, which are the increased financial costs to
the states from smoking. Thus, there is no attempt to perform a full social
benefit-cost analysis. The focus is much narrower, as it is on the financial
externalities alone. This set of lawsuits involves a staggering level of fi-
nancial stakes. The cigarette industry settled out of court with Mississippi
for $3.5 billion, Florida for $11.3 billion, Texas for $15.3 billion, and Min-
nesota for $6.6 billion, for a total settlement cost of $36.8 billion. In addi-
tion, the remaining states ultimately settled their suits in 1998 for an addi-
tional amount estimated in press accounts to be $206 billion (undiscounted)
over the next 25 years.
' See Viscusi, supra note 2.
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The most prominent initial effort to resolve this litigation occurred when
the cigarette industry and key representatives of the states drafted a "Pro-
posed Resolution" of the litigation in 1997." ' This document, in turn, was
to be the basis for congressional legislation that would resolve the dispute.6
After lengthy congressional debate over the terms of the agreement and the
cigarette industry's withdrawal of support for the legislation that ultimately
evolved, Congress rejected legislative resolution of the lawsuits.7
The terms of the proposed resolution are nevertheless informative of the
scale of the litigation and some of the most salient smoking policy issues.
To settle the state lawsuits, the cigarette industry would pay $368.5 billion.
They would pay $10 billion up front, followed by annual payments rising
from $8.5 billion initially to $15 billion in 5 years. These payments would
continue in perpetuity and would be adjusted upward for inflation (by the
greater of the increase in the consumer price index or 3 percent). Press ac-
counts focused on the total face value of the payments for the first 25 years,
or $368.5 billion. Put into present value terms using a 3 percent real rate
of interest, this amount is $255.6 billion for 25 years and $494.4 billion in
perpetuity.
These calculations assume, however, that cigarette consumption remains
unchanged as a result of this financial settlement. However, the level of all
subsequent payments is not fixed but is based on the amount raised from a
$.62 per pack tax in addition to the current average state and federal tax
total of $.56 per pack. Senator Ted Kennedy and others proposed that the
incremental tax be $1.50 per pack, decreasing the attractiveness of the pro-
posal to the industry and contributing to their eventual rejection of the legis-
lation. Whatever the ultimate tax increase would have been, the total
amount raised by the tax would have been less than estimated originally,
assuming no drop in consumption, because of cigarettes' negative price
elasticity of demand.
These demand effects are of particular policy import to the extent that
these elasticities differ across the population.8 A 10 percent increase in ciga-
rette prices would decrease smoking by 4-7 percent overall. This effect
may vary across the population. Based on the elasticity estimates reported
elsewhere, such a tax hike would decrease smoking rates for teenagers by
' The "Proposed Resolution" was released on June 20, 1997. Available on line at http://
www.stic.neu.edu/settlement/index.html. Accessed July 2, 1999.
6 In particular, see the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997),
introduced by Senator McCain.
' The major tobacco companies withdrew their support on April 8, 1998. See David E.
Rosenbaum, Cigarette Makers Quit Negotiations on Tobacco Bill, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1998,
at Al.
' For a survey of these studies see W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision
(1992).
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as much as 14 percent.9 Some smoking critics regard the price sensitivity
of smokers as undesirable to the extent that price responsiveness decreases
the total cigarette penalties paid. Moreover, they would rather have compa-
nies incur the penalty than consumers. Such criticisms fail to recognize that
to foster antismoking incentives, which they presumably regard as desir-
able, the tax cannot be lump sum and must alter the effective price consum-
ers pay.
The Proposed Resolution included major nonfinancial components as
well. The FDA would have been given broad authority to regulate ciga-
rettes. Included among these regulations would have been a new series of
nine rotating warnings and a ban on the use in advertising of human figures,
such as the Marlboro cowboy, or cartoon characters, such as Joe Camel,
who was retired voluntarily by R. J. Reynolds in 1997. There would also
have been a detailed set of initiatives to discourage underage smoking, in-
cluding additional tax increases if specified targets for reducing youth
smoking were not met.
In return, the cigarette companies were able to resolve all present and
future actions by state attorneys general. The settlement would have also
precluded all future class actions, all "addiction" claims, and all claims for
punitive damages. The comparatively low-cost, and largely unsuccessful,
individual lawsuits for past conduct would still be permitted. The prospects
of these individual lawsuits may have been affected by the strengthened
antismoking climate after the final settlement of the state suits. In February
1999, Phillip Morris lost a $51 million verdict in San Francisco to a female
smoker who contracted lung cancer.1 °
The state lawsuits were ultimately settled in a deal with the 46 states that
These elasticity estimates appear in Eugene M. Lewitt, Douglas Coate, & Michael Gross-
man, The Effects of Government Regulation on Teenage Smoking, 24 J. Law & Econ. 545
(1981). Other estimates fail to show this sensitivity, such as those in J. Wasserman et al.,
The Effects of Excise Taxes and Regulations on Cigarette Smoking, 10 J. Health Econ. 43
(1991). Other researchers fail to find a price effect on youth smoking initiation rates, as in
Stratford Douglas & Govind Hariharan, The Hazard of Starting Smoking: Estimates from a
Split Population Duration Model, 13 J. Health Econ. 213 (1994). Ongoing work also ques-
tions the strength of the youth response, as in Philip DeCicca, Donald Kenkel, & Alan Math-
ios, Putting out Fires: Will Higher Taxes Reduce Youth Smoking? (Working paper, Cornell
Univ., Dept. of Policy Analysis and Management, March 1999). For further discussion of
reasons for failure to find price response differences, see Michael Grossman, The Demand
for Cigarettes, 10 J. Health Econ. 101 (1991). Recent evidence on greater cigarette elasticities
of demand by young smokers appears in Frank J. Chaloupka & Michael Grossman, Price,
Tobacco Control Policies, and Youth Smoking (Working Paper 5740, NBER, September
1996). This evidence is still evolving, and a considerable debate remains regarding the extent
of any difference in elasticities, especially for large price changes.
'o For discussion of the verdict, see Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Industry
to Rethink Its Defense, Wall St. J., February 12, 1999, at B14. The large stakes involved in
the state settlement may have boosted the magnitude of the award, $50 million of which
consisted of punitive damages.
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had not already received an out-of-court settlement. The financial terms
were substantially less than the 1997 Proposed Resolution, reflecting both
the more limited scope of the agreement and some more recent courtroom
victories by the cigarette industry. Tobacco companies participating in the
settlement would pay the following amounts, most of which are adjusted
for inflation, the firm's market share, and the sales of nonparticipating man-
ufacturers, thus recognizing the potential for new entrants. Over a 10-year
period, firms would contribute $250 million to a foundation to reduce youth
smoking. Over a 5-year period, firms would contribute $1.45 billion to a
national public education fund directed at reducing smoking behavior.
Agreement payments included $1.5 million over 10 years to fund the execu-
tive committee, $50 million for enforcement, initial payments over 5 years
of $12.7 billion, annual payments through 2023 for a total of $190.0 billion,
and additional payments of $8.6 billion. The total of all these payment cate-
gories through 2023 is $213.0 billion, or a present value of $150.1 billion
at 3 percent interest. Moreover, annual payments would continue in perpe-
tuity at $9 billion, yielding a present value total of $281.6 billion.
The actual penalty amount may be less because the penalties are not fixed
but are adjusted for the firm's market share and for nonparticipating com-
pany sales. In economic terms, the penalties are almost tantamount to a per-
pack tax, which for an $8 billion annual payment would be $.33 per pack.
Shortly after the signing of the settlement, cigarette prices reportedly rose
nationally by about $.35 per pack, and they have since risen more. Higher
cigarette taxes will deter smoking behavior and will also reduce the total
penalty amounts paid.
The national settlement has antismoking provisions that are similar to
those in the Proposed Resolution, but less extensive: bans on cartoon char-
acters, limitation but not prohibition of sponsorships except for youth
events, elimination of outdoor advertising, ban on tobacco name merchan-
dise, and required funding of antismoking efforts. Absent are many of the
major provisions of the earlier proposal, including recognition of additional
FDA authority over cigarettes, settlement of all prospective class action and
addiction suits, and a new series of rotating cigarette warnings.
The national settlement also provided for the manufacturers to pay for
the states' litigation costs, including the fees of private attorneys. The ex-
traordinarily high level of these fees set by a board of three arbitrators re-
sulted in substantial controversy. In particular, the lawyers representing the
states in Florida, Mississippi, and Texas were awarded $8.1 billion in fees
by an arbitration panel." It is expected that similar multi-billion dollar fees
" For a discussion of these fees, see Lawyers and Their Fees: Knights in Golden Armor,
Economist, February 13, 1999, at 28.
HeinOnline  -- 42 J.L. & Econ. 580 1999
COSTS OF SMOKING
could push the total for all states above $20 billion for under 500 lawyers-
a staggering amount by any standard.
There have also been numerous other legal and regulatory efforts per-
taining to smoking. A major lawsuit now working its way through the fed-
eral courts focuses on whether the FDA currently has the legal authority
to regulate cigarettes as a drug. 2 Both OSHA and the U.S. Congress have
considered, but have not adopted, widespread bans on smoking in public
places. 3 Numerous localities have also adopted smoking restrictions, partic-
ularly as they affect underage smoking. 4 There have also been a variety of
lawsuits seeking damages for environmental tobacco smoke and claims of
addiction.
In this article, I will not provide a comprehensive assessment of all these
initiatives. By focusing on the state attorneys general suits, I will restrict the
attention to financial externalities to the state. This analysis consequently
considers the largest stakes component that has been the object of litigation,
but it does not delve into the myriad of related issues that are also of poten-
tial policy concern.
III. STATE-FEDERAL TAX ISSUES
A. Efficiency Criteria
Cigarettes are one of the most heavily taxed consumer commodities. As
a percentage of the product price, cigarette taxes exceeded the taxes on al-
cohol, gasoline, and other highly taxed consumer commodities. 5 In 1995,
for example, the overall cigarette tax rate was $.56 per pack, with $.32 go-
ing to the states and $.24 going to the federal government.
16
Although taxes have an obvious political role to play as a revenue-raising
device, they may serve additional economic functions as well. If smoking
decisions are not optimal, either because of failures in individual decisions
12 Opposing viewpoints on the legality of FDA jurisdiction under existing legislation are
presented in Cass Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies at Common Law
Courts, 47 Duke L. J. 1013 (1998); and Richard Merrill, FDA's Attempt to Regulate Tobacco
Products: Audacious and Anomalous, 47 Duke L. J. 1071 (1998).
3 For a discussion of these proposals, see W. Kip Viscusi, Secondhand Smoke: Facts and
Fantasy, 18 Regulation 42 (1995).
14 For a comprehensive assessment of regulations affecting youth tobacco use and their
effect, see Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 Duke
L. J. 1143 (1998).
" For a review of tax rates for different product groups, see Don Fullerton & Diane L.
Rodgers, Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden? (1991).
6 For these statistics, see the Tobacco Institute, 30 Tax Burden on Tobacco, at iii (1995).
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or societal externalities, cigarette taxes could serve as a form of Pigouvian
tax to align the private incentives with social objectives.
The economic policy questions raised by an analysis of state-specific ex-
ternalities are twofold. First, to what extent do cigarette taxes reflect the
overall social costs of smoking? Second, does the composition of these
taxes lead to appropriate levels of compensation of the different govern-
mental entities involved? More specifically, is the state-federal distribution
of the taxes commensurate with the state-federal distribution of the external
costs of smoking?
To see the potential role of cigarette taxes, it is useful to consider a sim-
ple model. Let p be the probability that smoking will lead to harmful health
effects and P(p) be the perceived probability by the smoker of adverse
health effects. The smoker's income is Y, the cost of cigarettes is C, and
the medical costs to the smoker of ill health are M. Let the consumer's util-
ity function in good health when smoking be U, the utility function of a
smoker in ill health be V, and the utility function when not smoking be W.
For any given level of income Y, U(Y) > V(Y), U'(Y) - V'(Y) > 0, and
U"(Y), V"(Y) - 0. Similarly, W'(Y) > 0 and W"(Y) :5; 0. Thus, I assume
that the individual is either risk neutral or risk averse in all three possible
states and that both the utility and the marginal utility of income are at least
as great when healthy as when in ill health, for any given level of income.
A person will choose to smoke if the perceived expected utility of smok-
ing exceeds the expected utility of not smoking, where this condition is
given by
(1 - P(p))U(Y - C) + P(p)V(Y - C - M) > W(Y). (1)
This choice problem omits two potential concerns from the standpoint of
social welfare. First, the actual probability of an adverse health conse-
quence may be different from the perceived probability. Given the formula-
tion above, this deviation will potentially lead to a welfare loss to the indi-
vidual, not to the rest of society. The second potential departure from the
private choice framework is that if smoking harms one's health there will
be external insurance costs to the state, S, insurance costs to the federal gov-
ernment, F, and private insurance externalities that are not recouped
through smoker-specific premiums, I. These components may be positive
or negative, as there may be some insurance subsidies being generated. The
criterion for social efficiency is that smoking be desirable when consumers
perceive the risks of smoking accurately and internalize all smoking costs:
(1 - p)U(Y- C) +pV(Y- C-M- S- F-I) > W(Y). (2)
By setting tax rates appropriately, it is possible to align the private incen-
tives of smokers and the social efficiency properties of the smoking deci-
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sion. Let s be the proportional state tax percentage andf be the proportional
federal tax percentage. Then private incentives will be aligned with social
efficiency if s and f are set to satisfy
(1 - P(p)) U(Y - C(1 + s +f)) + P(p) V(Y - C(1 + s +f) - M) (3)
= (l -p)U(Y- C) +pV(Y- C- M- S- F- I).
Taxes must be sufficient to lead to the same desirability of smoking as
would prevail if smokers perceived risks accurately and internalized all
costs. As in the previous literature on smoking externalities, the primary
focus of this article and the lawsuits is on issues that are somewhat nar-
rower than total social efficiency. Moreover, the state suits do not include
as part of the claim possible utility losses of smokers. If there are such
harms, they can be addressed through individual tort suits. Potential imper-
fections in individual choice due to biased risk beliefs, errors in discounting
and intertemporal choice, or the role of addiction and habituation phenom-
ena all relate to private welfare losses. 7 Such matters are not the concern
of the state suits focusing on financial externalities to the state when calcu-
lating the value of the economic damages.
B. Wrongful Behavior
Even if there are not external costs attributable to smoking, the legal ra-
tionale for the suits is unclear. If the assumption of risk defense is valid for
claims by the smokers, this defense would also travel with such claims
when cast as independent claims by the state for medical assistance to
smokers. A principal basis for the suits is the claim that consumers did not
in fact assume the risk because they were not aware of the hazards due to
the deceptive practices of the industry. Risk awareness issues are conse-
quently central to the states' suits. Similarly, in all the formulations above,
the accuracy of risk beliefs plays a central role in determining whether there
are private losses due to smoking. Risk awareness concerns have been
prominent in assessing the state of consumer knowledge and whether the
cigarette industry has been guilty of any wrongful behavior that has led to
misperception of the risk. Risk awareness consequently is pertinent in de-
termining liability and also in setting damages. Only the portion of the
7 The role of discounting has been of particular concern. If, as some researchers hypothe-
size, youths err in their discounting of future health losses, there will be a market failure.
These losses will, however, be private losses and will not alter the financial externality esti-
mates, which include the costs of all smoking, not just irrational smoking by youths. See,
generally, Gary Becker & Casey Mulligan, The Endogenous Determination of Time Prefer-
ence, 112 Q. J. Econ. 729 (1997); and Kenneth Warner et al., Criteria for Determining an
Optimal Cigarette Tax: The Economist's Perspective, 4 Tobacco Control 380 (1995).
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economic costs of cigarettes attributable to wrongful behavior can be recov-
ered.
Are people aware of smoking risks? A brief review of the risk perception
evidence suggests that on average people tend to overestimate the risks of
smoking. To judge the accuracy of risk beliefs, one needs a risk reference
point to determine the direction of any error. The reference points I use are
derived from Surgeon Generals' reports and related government sources."
For lung cancer, the true risk range for the proportion of the population who
will die from cancer is 0.05-0. 10 in 1985 and 0.06-0.13 in 1991 and there-
after. 19
To assess the accuracy of the risk beliefs, I will consider data from three
surveys: a 1985 national survey focusing on lung cancer risk beliefs; a 1991
North Carolina survey focusing on lung cancer mortality, total mortality,
and life expectancy loss; and a 1997 national survey focusing on lung can-
cer, total mortality risk, and life expectancy loss.2° Consider the risk beliefs
of smokers, which are below those of the entire population. The assessed
lung cancer probabilities were 0.37 in 1985 and 0.40 in 1997 for national
samples, with an assessed lung cancer mortality risk of 0.31 in a North Car-
olina regional 1991 sample. These values all greatly exceed the true risk
reference point.
The results for total assessed mortality risk are similar, where the extent
of the overassessment is based on a true risk reference point of 0.16-0.32
in 1985 and 0.18-0.36 in 1991 and thereafter. Smokers assessed the total
smoking mortality risk at 0.47 in the 1991 North Carolina sample and 0.42
in the 1997 national sample.
The third set of risk questions focuses on the assessed life expectancy
loss, which has a true value of 3.6-7.2 years. To avoid testing the respon-
dent's understanding of normal life expectancy rather than the assessed in-
cremental loss due to smoking, the question wordings tell respondents the
incremental life expectancy in the 1991 survey and the total life expectancy
in the 1997 survey, where each of these assessments is gender specific for
18 See Viscusi, supra note 8, for further discussion of these measures, which takes the
government's estimates of death and related outcomes at face value and converts them into
probabilities.
19 These estimates are for lung cancer mortality, but since over 90 percent of all cases of
lung cancer are fatal, the incidence rate for lung cancer (the reference point for my 1985 and
1997 surveys) is similar to the lung cancer fatality rate (the reference point for my 1991
survey).
20 For a report on the 1985 and 1991 surveys, see Viscusi, supra note 8. The 1985 and
1991 surveys, which were prepared in support of litigation, were administered by Audits and
Surveys Worldwide. The text of the 1985 and 1991 risk questions appears in id. The 1997
text parallels the 1991 survey.
HeinOnline  -- 42 J.L. & Econ. 584 1999
COSTS OF SMOKING
a standardized 21-year-old. 2' Estimates of the life expectancy loss for male
smokers due to smoking are 6.9 years in the 1991 local sample and 7.9
years in the 1997 national sample. For female smokers the assessed loss is
10.9 years in 1991 and 12.3 years in 1997. In each case, the average as-
sessed life expectancy loss across the smoking population exceeded the up-
per bound of the estimated true risk.
22
Overall, the available evidence with respect to smoking risk perceptions
suggests that smokers are aware of smoking risks and perhaps overassess
the risks of smoking. 23 These perceptions in turn influence smoking behav-
ior in the expected direction. If there were evidence that smokers did not
adequately recognize the risks they faced, then the government could im-
pose excise taxes, which, from an economic standpoint, could discourage
smoking behavior in the same way as would higher risk perceptions. For
example, a cigarette tax rate that is 30.8 percent of the retail price (the na-
tional average in 1985) would have the same effect of decreasing the proba-
bility of smoking in that year as would a lung cancer risk perception of 0.17
if the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes is -0.4.24 For higher elastic-
ity values, the effect on the smoking probability would be equivalent to a
larger lung cancer risk perception. Younger smokers and teenagers poten-
tially may be more responsive to the effect of higher excise taxes.
The discussion below focuses on the present value of the social financial
costs associated with smoking decisions at a point in time. The analysis will
not consider the private costs associated with quitting smoking. The social
2 Previous results do not provide such life expectancy information, so the question may
be eliciting understanding of normal life expectancy and not just understanding of the effect
of smoking on life expectancy. The result is that smokers, who are less well educated than
nonsmokers, underestimate their life expectancy loss. See D. S. Hamermesh & F. W. Hamer-
mesh, Does Perception of Life Expectancy Reflect Health Knowledge? 73 Am. J. Pub. Health
911 (1983). This is discussed in Viscusi, supra note 8.
22 Schoenbaum suggests that heavy smokers overestimate their survival probability based
on data from the Health and Retirement Study. See Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Un-
derstand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Sur-
vey, 87 Am. J. Pub. Health 755 (1997). That risk question was not well posed, as it asked
respondents to rate their survival chances from 0 to 10, which is not a probability scale and
which does not inform respondents of their normal life expectancy. The resulting patterns
are often implausible, as female respondents rate their odds of survival to age 75 and age 85
as being lower the older they get, which is the opposite of actual life expectancy patterns.
For a more thorough critique, see W. Kip Viscusi & Jahn K. Hakes, Why the Health and
Retirement Survey Survival Probability Is Not a Probability (unpublished manuscript, De-
cember 1998).
23 For a review of this evidence, see Viscusi, supra note 8; and W. Kip Viscusi, Construc-
tive Cigarette Regulation, 47 Duke L. J. 1095 (1998).
24 See Viscusi, supra note 8, at 109.
25 The extent of such a differential effort remains a matter of substantial debate, as noted
above.
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welfare consequences of the habituation or addiction phenomenon depend
in large part on the extent to which the choices leading to this behavior are
voluntary.26 Since the primary concern of this paper is with the insurance
externalities of smoking rather than with the total social welfare effects of
smoking, it is not necessary to incorporate these concerns in the analysis.
C. Smoking Externalities
The first major study of smoking externalities in the literature by Shoven
et al. in 198927 focused on the financial effects of smoking on the Social
Security program. This study found that smokers generated a net subsidy
to nonsmokers since their early deaths from smoking prevented them from
collecting the same level of Social Security benefits as are received by non-
smokers. The salience of the Social Security effect and the potential for net
subsidies by smokers because of the mortality effects of smoking remains
a continuing theme in the literature. However, because subsequent studies
have a broader focus, they are more pertinent to this paper.
The next set of more comprehensive studies of the social costs of smok-
ing addressed whether the excise taxes from cigarettes exceeded the total
expected insurance externalities associated with smoking. More specifi-
cally, the question addressed in these studies is whether
(s + f)C > p(S + F+ I). (4)
The conclusion reached by Manning et al. (1991) and Gravelle and Zim-
merman (1994) was that on balance the excise taxes imposed on cigarettes
exceeded the expected insurance costs.28
In earlier work I extended these analyses of national insurance costs
26 For a detailed empirical analysis of the addiction issue, see Gary S. Becker, Michael
Grossman, & Kevin M. Murphy, An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction, 84 Am.
Econ. Rev. 396 (1994); and Frank J. Chaloupka, Rational Addictive Behavior and Cigarette
Smoking, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 722 (1991). Additional empirical evidence on smoking quit rates
appears in Viscusi, supra note 8. Hersch, supra note 14, presents evidence on addiction and
habituation perceptions.
27 See Shoven, Sundberg, & Bunker, supra note 2.
' See Manning et al., supra note 2, and Gravelle & Zimmerman, supra note 2. The level
of insurance costs is, however, sensitive to the discount rate that is assumed. The discussion
here assumes a real rate of discount of 3 percent except when indicated otherwise. For dis-
count rates close to zero, the net social costs of smoking are much less, whereas for discount
rates that are very high, the present value of the insurance externalities increases and reverses
sign. In the Netherlands, the self-financing status of cigarettes is even greater, as smokers
have lower health care costs than nonsmokers. Within the health care component alone, the
effect of premature death makes cigarettes self-financing. For a discussion, see Jan Baren-
dregt, Luc Bonneux, & Paul van der Maas, The Health Care Costs of Smoking, 377 New
Eng. J. Med. 1052 (1997).
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FIGURE 1.-Per capita cigarette consumption in the United States (1923-97). Tar levels
have been normalized using the 1944 level as a base.
in two principal ways. 29 First, I incorporated recognition of the chang-
ing tar content of cigarettes in the calculations, which has declined
much faster than has cigarette consumption (see Figure 1).30 Perhaps
somewhat paradoxically, making the tar adjustment and increasing the
safety of the cigarettes increases the net social costs imposed by
smoking because of a decrease in the cost savings associated with early
smoker mortality. The second principal difference between my work and
other studies in the literature is the inclusion of the recent evidence on the
social costs of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS).3 The net financial
2 See Viscusi, supra note 2.
3 As is discussed in id., the effect of tar levevls on cigarette riskiness remains controversial
because it depends, for example, on how one smokes. These estimates, however, correct for
effects of changes in tar levels on the number of cigarettes smoked. Low-tar cigarettes may
also lead to different forms of cancer than higher-tar cigarettes. Estimates without the tar
adjustment will be presented as well.
31 These cost estimates take the highly uncertain estimates of environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS) costs by OSHA and EPA at face value and, in conjunction with estimates of
the value of life equal to $5 million per life, generate social cost figures for ETS. The health
effects are, however, potentially substantial, as indicated in id. The principal health effect is
that of heart disease. The second set of results reported by Steenland et al. confirmed evi-
dence of the earlier linkages used in the heart disease loss estimates reported in Viscusi, su-
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externality for the state from ETS is not significant, as will be discussed
below.
The issues arising with respect to the litigation being filed by a large
number of states is whether there is a net social cost imposed on the state.
This issue is framed in terms of whether
sC > pS, (5)
where this calculation is undertaken on a state-specific basis. Thus, to the
extent that much of the external cost savings arise through cost savings to
the federal government, this influence would not be directly accounted for
in such a calculation.
One can also break out the costs for the federal government to assess the
net costs at the federal level. Federal revenues exceed the financial costs if
fC > pF. (6)
The financial cost implications are fairly straightforward if both the state
and federal governments are affected similarly. If, however, the federal
government benefits financially but the state governments do not, matters
become more complex. Conceivably, if the federal government gains and
the state governments lose, there could be a financial exchange between the
federal government and the states. One could, for example, earmark part of
the federal excise tax for the states if the federal government profited from
cigarette smoking but the states did not. A higher federal share of Medicaid
expenditures would accomplish the same objective. Or, more simply, the
state could simply raise its excise tax level.
D. How the States Calculated Costs
The court's assessment of the costs of smoking depends in part, however,
on what it chooses to recognize as cost components. Although inequality
(5) captures the appropriate net social cost calculation from the standpoint
of the states, in their litigation, the states focused on a narrower question
of whether the health care costs alone are positive. The prospective federal
pra note 2. They note, "Results are consistent with the prior reports that never-smokers cur-
rently exposed to ETS have about 20 percent higher CHD death rates. However, our data do
not show consistent dose-response trends and are possibly subject to confounding by unmeas-
ured risk factors." See Kyle Steenland et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Coronary
Heart Disease in the American Cancer Society CPS-ll Cohort, 94 Circulation 622 (1996).
Another study on nurses also found an environmental tobacco smoke-health linkage; see
Ichiro Kawachi et aL, A Prospective Study of Passive Smoking and Coronary Heart Disease,
95 Circulation 2374 (1997). The adoption of smoking restrictions also will continue to reduce
the costs of ETS in the future. By 1991, 85 percent of all firms had instituted smoking poli-
cies, and restrictions on smoking have continued to increase. Decreasing exposure to ETS
consequently will decrease potential costs.
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suit will probably also focus on health costs alone. Thus, the states are seek-
ing to exclude from consideration components of S that may be negative as
well as the right side of this inequality-the role of excise taxes. 2 The em-
phasis here is on a more complete social accounting since there is no eco-
nomic justification for selective inclusion of the different cost components
when determining net financial consequences.
Although the states' effort to exclude all cost reductions and taxes paid
is a useful summary of their position, it is also instructive to analyze the
specific aspects of the damages claimed. The focal point of the states'
claimed losses is on the increased costs for Medicaid. To the extent that
smokers are sicker, Medicaid expenses will rise, imposing additional costs
on the state budgets. Although a sound economic calculation could lead to
such a result, there are nevertheless serious and fundamental flaws with the
states' approach. First, in calculating the increased medical costs, states
count not only the costs incurred by the states but also the federal govern-
ment's share of Medicaid expenditures. As a matter of program structure,
Medicaid costs are shared between the state and the federal government,
where the state's share depends on the income level in the state. All states
have sought reimbursement for both the state and the federal cost compo-
nents, although it is only the state portion of the claim that represents a true
cost increase for the state budget. The justification given for including the
federal share is that the tobacco companies cannot include federal pay-
ments, which they claim should be excluded since they are payments by a
source independent of the tobacco companies; that is, they are a collateral
source.33 However, the federal payments are not a collateral source in the
usual sense, as Medicaid costs are simply shared by the state and federal
governments as a matter of policy. It is also noteworthy in this regard that
the states vigorously objected when federal budget officials subsequently
suggested that the federal government should share in the value of the Pro-
posed Resolution, if in fact it had been passed by Congress, even though
such sharing would have been entirely consistent with the nature of the
damages claim filed by the states. The 1999 federal budget assumes that the
federal government will ultimately share in these funds, but the compromise
outcome President Clinton has proposed to the governors is that they make
expenditures in certain designated areas.
The second shortcoming in the analysis of medical costs by the states is
that these claims are not restricted to costs actually incurred by smokers but
instead charge smokers for costs as if they had nonsmokers' life expec-
32 See Mem. Supp. State's Mot. Ruling In Limine, or, Alternatively, Partial Summ. J., In
re Moore, Att'y Gen. ex rel., Miss. Tobacco Litigation (No. 94-1429), Aug. 11, 1995.
" See id. at 1, 16.
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tancy. Proper recognition of the life expectancy of smokers is not a "death
credit," as the states have labeled it, but rather, it simply represents appro-
priate recognition of costs that the state incurred. There are no damages to
the state in terms of higher Medicaid costs once smokers are dead. These
factors will account for most of the difference between my estimates and
those published.
From a legal standpoint, the costs for which the cigarette companies
should be liable are those attributable to their wrongful behavior. Thus, to
the extent that deceptive advertising, antitrust violations (for example, con-
spiracy to suppress development of safer cigarettes), or other illegal prac-
tices led to additional smoking-related costs, the state would be able to file
a legitimate claim for the portion of such costs attributable to the behavior.
However, the states' suits do not distinguish the influence of such wrongful
behavior but instead include all smoking-attributable costs, which implicitly
assumes that smoking rates would be zero had it not been for the wrongful
conduct of the cigarette industry.
There are also a myriad of other technical issues that arise in calculating
costs. Cigarette smokers tend to be systematic risk takers, not simply in
terms of their smoking behavior. For example, they are more likely to be
injured both at work and at home.34 To the extent that the estimation of
smoking-related costs does not adequately control for risk factors correlated
with smoking status, it will tend to overstate the level of such costs. As we
will see below, however, including such refinements that reduce the cost
estimates will not prove to be critical once the other fundamental aspects
of the cost calculations are done properly.
Another class of financial consequences of smoking pertains to the ef-
fects of smoking-related health consequences on state pension costs, nurs-
ing home expenditures, and other nonmedical components of state alloca-
tions. On balance, such costs' effects are beneficial to the state since the
premature deaths of smokers will reduce the total costs of many of these
programs. The states have resisted such considerations, claiming that they
are a death credit. For example, in the memorandum regarding its tobacco
litigation, the state of Mississippi made the following comments:
A credit to the cigarette industry for any monetary savings in elderly health care,
as well as other savings resulting in the premature deaths of smokers, is utterly
repugnant to a civilized society and must be rejected on grounds of public policy.35
... The contention of entitlement to an "early death" credit is, on its face, void
See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors, 28 J. Drug
Issues 645 (1998).
" Mem., In re Moore (No. 94-1429), supra note 32, at 3.
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as against public policy. That policy and basic human decency preclude the defen-
dants from putting forth the perverse and depraved argument that by killing Missis-
sippians prematurely, they provide an economic benefit to the State. No court of
equity should countenance, condone, or sanction such base, evil, and corrupt argu-
ments. 36 ... The defendants' argument is indeed ghoulish. They are merchants of
death. Seeking a credit for a purported economic benefit for early death is akin to
robbing the graves of the Mississippi smokers who died from tobacco-related ill-
nesses. No court of law or equity should entertain such a defense or counterclaim.
It is offensive to human decency, an affront to justice, uncharacteristic of civilized
society, and unquestionably contrary to public policy.37
Indeed, if the states truly believe that the cigarette companies are "mer-
chants of death," one wonders why they have not banned cigarettes rather
than sought profits through excise taxes and the recent litigation. The con-
troversial exercise of tallying the financial consequences of smoking was
initiated by the states, not the defendants. The objective of such an effort
should be to calculate the true financial costs to the state, not to focus selec-
tively on the positive components and to ignore the negative cost-reducing
effects. Suppose, for example, that Medicaid consisted of Medicaid Part
One, for which cigarettes raised the costs by $1,000, and Medicaid Part
Two, for which they reduce the costs by $1,500. Is the net effect of smok-
ing that the states are entitled to collect the $1,000 cost increase, or should
one include the reduced cost as well? From the standpoint of efficient deter-
rence and optimal insurance, it is always the net economic damage that
should be assessed.
The final major component of concern consists of the cigarette-related
taxes. The states are correct from an economic standpoint in arguing that
income taxes paid and general sales taxes paid because of cigarette con-
sumption should not be credited to cigarettes. Presumably, if consumers
were not purchasing these products they would be buying other goods that
would also be generating similar sales or income taxes. What we want to
distinguish is the incremental additional taxes paid by cigarettes, which
would be the excise taxes that are distinctive to this product.
The states, nevertheless, consistently seek to exclude the role of excise
taxes. One can view the excise tax mechanism as an ex ante substitute for
the ex post damages payments in the courts. Suppose, for example, that cig-
arettes generated some positive costs Ps per pack in the state. If this rela-
tionship were known on a prospective basis, the state could charge smokers
at the time of purchase for these costs through an excise tax mechanism.
Recouping these costs through litigation is simply the analog of excise
36 Id. at 2 1.
7 Id. at 23.
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taxes except that it is done after the fact and involves much higher levels
of transaction costs. Indeed, the structure of the settlement functions as an
excise tax, not as a lump sum settlement. The mechanism of collecting for
the costs imposed on the state is not a matter of economic consequence
other than with respect to accounting for transactions costs, which are
higher in litigation contexts. Would, however, states have levied higher ex-
cise taxes had the health effects of cigarettes been known to the state, as-
suming they were not? Also, from a legal standpoint, is this distinction con-
sequential? Such key issues were never resolved because of the out-of-court
settlement.
The guiding principle for my calculations is to assess the net differential
costs specifically linked to cigarettes. The approach here will be to under-
take a comprehensive cost-accounting framework that recognizes both ex-
cise taxes as well as all insurance-related consequences of cigarette smok-
ing for states.38 To the extent that excise taxes are based on the state of
information at the time of the smoking decision and litigation is based on
retrospective assessment, excise taxes will be better suited to provide appro-
priate levels of deterrence based on the expected social costs of smoking at
the time those decisions are made.
The states wish to exclude excise taxes because "tax revenue is the sole
domain of the legislature, not the defendants." 39 The fact that legislatures,
and not the cigarette companies, set taxes does not affect the net economic
cost to the state. The states' second argument against excise taxes is that
they were "not paid by the defendants. They were paid by the consumers
of cigarettes and those who treated them." ' However, all taxes are shared
by the consumers and producers, with the shares depending upon the rela-
tive elasticities of supply and demand.
IV. EXTERNALITIES FOR THE COUNTRY AND
FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
A. National Baseline Estimates
The basic building blocks of the analysis will consist of estimates of the
national externalities associated with cigarette smoking. The essence of my
methodological approach will be to adjust the national estimates in various
ways to reflect the different cost level for the states. Thus, for each category
38 It should be emphasized, however, that my tally will consider only insurance, pension
costs, tax consequences, fires, and related factors. There may be broader economic conse-
quences as well. These are discussed in Tollison & Wagner, supra note 3.
" See Mem., In re Moore (No. 94-1429), supra note 32, at 2.
4 Id.
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TABLE 1
SOCIAL COSTS OF SMOKING IN 1995
REAL RATE OF INTEREST
0% 3% 5%
No tar adjustment:
Total medical care .7542 .5804 .5333
Sick leave .0000 .0134 .0207
Group life insurance .2539 .1439 .0965
Nursing home care -. 6325 -. 2390 -. 0801
Retirement pension -3.0458 -1.2589 -. 3857
Fires .0149 .0167 .0189
Taxes on earnings .9321 .4247 .1288
Total net costs -1.7232 -. 3186 .3323
Tar-adjusted estimates:
Total medical care .6341 .4806 .4374
Sick leave .0029 .0119 .0182
Group life insurance .2129 .1206 .0809
Nursing home care -. 5490 -. 2074 -. 0695
Retirement pension -2.5532 - 1.0553 -. 3233
Fires .0149 .0167 .0189
Taxes on earnings .7545 .3438 .1042
Total net costs -1.4829 -. 2891 .2668
Manning et al. assumptions:
Total medical care .5113 .3825 .3453
Sick leave .0034 .0140 .0216
Group life insurance .1704 .0966 .0647
Nursing home care -. 3409 -. 1288 -. 0432
Retirement pension -2.5564 -1.0566 -. 3237
Fires .0170 .0191 .0216
Taxes on earnings .9373 .4271 .1295
Total net costs -1.2577 -. 2461 .2158
NOTE.-All estimates update the 1993 cost estimates in W. Kip Viscusi,
Secondhand Smoke: Facts and Fantasy, 18 Regulation 42 (1995), to 1995 data
whenever possible. Estimates are costs per pack.
of expenditures this approach distinguishes to the extent feasible the state
and federal share of these expenditures, as well as factors that influence the
state share differently across states, such as differences in per capita income
levels or nursing home care utilization rates.
Table 1 presents the baseline estimates that will serve as the reference
point for the discussion below. This table updates my previously published
results for 1993-95 data whenever possible.4' As a result, their underlying
assumptions are comparable to the analysis for the states presented below.
Three different sets of estimates appear. The set of estimates at the bottom
"' The previously published data appear in Viscusi, supra note 2.
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of the table consists of a simple update of a past analysis to take into ac-
count price changes.42 There is no effort within these calculations to change
any of the underlying assumptions, such as changes in program benefits lev-
els. The top set of estimates in Table 1 updates the past analysis for prices
but also for many substantive changes in these programs, such as the
change in the percent of the population in nursing homes. 43 This middle set
of cost estimates does not make adjustments for the changing tar content of
cigarettes. The third set of estimates in Table 1 consists of cost estimates
adjusting for the tar content of cigarettes, where this adjustment is based on
a 20-year moving average of the cigarette tar content to reflect the lag time
before risk exposures lead to cancer and heart disease.
Since the health care costs associated with cigarettes tend to be more im-
mediate than the insurance-related financial savings, the choice of the dis-
count rate affects the present value of the cost per pack of cigarettes. The
cost estimates in Table I do not represent the contemporaneous costs but
rather the present value of the ultimate stream of costs associated with a
pack of cigarettes. In each case, estimates appear for three different real
discount rates-0 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent. The real riskless rate
of return in the United States has been in the vicinity of 1-3 percent, so
the intermediate case shown in Table 1 is probably the most plausible. For
simplicity, all discussions below will focus on results using the 3 percent
assumption.
Consider the components of the cost estimates for the middle set of re-
sults without a tar adjustment. The total medical care cost externality aver-
ages $.58 per pack, where about two-thirds of these costs are incurred be-
fore smokers reach age 65. Sick leave and fires are relatively minor cost
items, averaging only $.01-$.02 per pack. Group life insurance costs aver-
age $.14 per pack, as smokers' earlier expected mortality increases the pres-
ent value of life insurance costs.
The remaining cost components represent cost savings associated with
cigarettes. Although the higher expected morbidity of smokers increases a
variety of costs, because of smokers' earlier mortality, smokers on average
42 The comprehensiveness of these cost estimates parallels that reported in Manning et al.,
which my study updates; see Manning et al., supra note 2. Their study omits the extra mater-
nity costs and costs of neonatal care due to smoking. In their view, consideration of these
costs would boost the medical cost estimate by 2 cents per pack (at 84), or 5 percent of their
total medical cost estimation. Thus, there would be less than a penny per pack adjustment in
the state medical cost numbers. Calculation of the value of life of the fetal deaths would
boost the external costs considerably, but these costs are not financial externalities that are
the target of the state suits.
4' For a detailed discussion of these procedures, see Viscusi, supra note 2, especially the
appendix. The identical procedure was used in that paper except that I use 1995 data for the
current analysis. The Appendix to this article describes many of these data sources.
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save society -$.24 per pack in nursing home care and -$1.26 per pack in
retirement pensions.
The final cost component in the various calculations in Table 1 is taxes
on earnings, which involve a cost of $.42 per pack. This tax figure reflects
only the payroll taxes for programs such as social security, not income
taxes. The rationale for excluding income taxes is that since deceased
smokers do not reap the benefits of public spending once they are dead, it
would be inappropriate to hold them responsible for income taxes they did
not pay.' Payroll taxes that finance retirement and medical care programs
for the aged merit inclusion in the analysis since the cost savings for prema-
ture mortality are recognized.
To calculate the net financial costs associated with smoking, one must
recognize both the forgone benefits and the forgone tax revenues. A
straightforward updating of the assumptions made in a past analysis indi-
cates that the net social cost of cigarettes is -$.25 per pack, which is a cost
savings.45 If this analysis is updated to reflect changes in program structure,
benefit utilization rates, and similar factors, then the net social costs associ-
ated with smoking average -$.32 per pack without any tar adjustment.
With a tar adjustment, the cost savings are -$.29 per pack. Because of the
lower-risk potency of cigarettes after the tar adjustment and the smaller
mortality cost savings, the cost estimates are scaled down with the tar ad-
justment.
An observation in a similar vein is that the cost savings are greatest in
my analysis without the tar adjustment, which is possibly surprising since
in that analysis the total medical care costs are also the highest. By contrast,
the analysis with the lowest total net cost savings is the update of the previ-
ous analysis for which the total medical care cost impositions are the lowest
of the three sets of estimates.' Although the shifts in the analysis are not
exactly proportional, the updating procedures that increase estimates of the
total medical care costs also tend to increase the estimates of the cost off-
sets of smoking, with the net result being that there is a greater cost savings
when cigarettes are potentially more costly. It should be emphasized that
these cost savings reflect only the financial externalities associated with
smoking. They do not also capture the $.56 per pack excise tax value paid
on each pack of cigarettes.
A potentially large economic externality that has been omitted from the
cost calculations is the cost associated with environmental tobacco smoke.
" An identical assumption is made by Manning et al., supra note 2; and Gravelle & Zim-
merman, supra note 2.
Updating the assumptions reported in Manning et al., supra note 2.
46 id.
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These costs are much debated, highly uncertain, but of great significance
based on the expected risk levels assessed by government agencies. An ear-
lier procedure by the author used the environmental tobacco smoke risk es-
timates prepared by OSHA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), in conjunction with an implicit value of life of $5 million.47 This
approach generated a cost of environmental tobacco smoke ranging from
$.07 to $.68 per pack.48 The midpoint environmental tobacco smoke cost
estimate is $.25 per pack. These costs are almost all direct health costs
rather than the financial externalities that are the focus of the article here.
Since the upper bound of the environmental tobacco smoke cost estimates
for the states yields a financial cost of under $.005 per pack, the analysis
presented here will exclude this cost component.
B. Costs to the State of Mississippi
Table 2 presents the state of Mississippi counterparts to the national esti-
mates presented above (in 1995 dollars). The estimates address three differ-
ent scenarios-the health effects invariant to tar level assumption, estimates
with the tar changes recognized, and a simple update of an earlier analysis
but on a state-specific basis.49
The tax rate per pack of cigarettes in Mississippi is $.18 per pack. The
question is whether the net social externalities exceed that amount. As can
be seen by the summary of these costs, the total net cost of smoking in
Mississippi is the cost savings of -$.03 per pack with tar adjustments and
-$.04 per pack without tar adjustments, excluding the excise tax payment
amount. The update of the earlier study but on a state-specific basis leads
to a cost savings of -$.02 per pack.5°
These cost estimates reflected a series of adjustments from the earlier na-
tional estimates presented above. The procedure used for transforming the
national estimates into state estimates represented straightforward applica-
tion of a series of adjustment factors to reflect state cost shares and state
differences. The Appendix to this paper lists the data sources for the various
adjustments to be described below.
To see the general approach for developing these cost estimates, let us
begin with the focal point of the state litigation efforts-medical care costs.
" See Viscusi, supra note 2.
48 These estimates are for the tar-adjusted case. The estimates for the case without the tar
adjustment are almost identical. Additional recent studies have bolstered the environmental
tobacco smoke-health cost linkage but do not alter the overall spirit of the earlier estimates.
See Steenland et al., supra note 3 1; and Kawachi et al., supra note 3 1.
41 Updating results reported in Manning et al., supra note 2.
o Id.
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TABLE 2
STATE BURDEN OF INSURANCE EXTERNALITIES IN 1995
(Cost per Pack)
MISSISSIPPI STATE ESTIMATE
(for Given Real Rate of Interest)
0% 3% 5%
Health effects invariant to
tar level:
Total medical care .0261 .0201 .0185
Sick leave .0000 .0009 .0014
Group life insurance .0096 .0054 .0036
Nursing home care -. 0755 -. 0285 -. 0096
Retirement pension -. 1241 -. 0513 -. 0157
Fires .0000 .0000 .0000
Taxes on earnings .0385 .0175 .0053
Total net costs -. 1253 -. 0358 .0036
Tar changes recognized:
Total medical care .0220 .0167 .0152
Sick leave .0002 .0008 .0013
Group life insurance .0080 .0045 .0030
Nursing home care -. 0655 -. 0247 -. 0083
Retirement pension -. 1040 -. 0430 -. 0132
Fires .0000 .0000 .0000
Taxes on earnings .0312 .0142 .0043
Total net costs -. 1082 -. 0315 .0023
Manning et al. assumptions:
Total medical care .0177 .0133 .0120
Sick leave .0002 .0010 .0015
Group life insurance .0064 .0036 .0024
Nursing home care -. 0407 -. 0154 -. 0051
Retirement pension -. 1041 -. 0430 -. 0132
Fires .0000 .0000 .0000
Taxes on earnings .0387 .0176 .0053
Total net costs -. 0817 -. 0229 .0029
Medical care costs for the states include two main components: Medicaid
and other medical expenditures, which consist of uncompensated care in
community hospitals and other state medical expenditures. Medicaid costs
are shared by both the federal government and the states, where the average
federal share for all states was 60 percent in 1995. The rate of federal
matching differs by state and is a critical component in determining the
state cost share. This rate is higher for Mississippi than for the United States
as a whole due to the Medicaid formula that increases the federal matching
rate as the per capita income of the state declines. Thus, in Mississippi the
federal matching rate is 79 percent.
Since Mississippi is poorer than the national average, the need-based
Medicaid program serves a larger fraction of its citizenry-roughly one and
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a half times the national average. However, the state of Mississippi also
has lower operating costs (wages, rent, contracted services), and it uses less
technologically advanced medical procedures, which account for a lower
cost per Medicaid recipient.
The estimates adjust for state differences in non-Medicaid expenditures
similarly. After dividing these expenditures into uncompensated care in
community hospitals and other state medical expenditures, one can calcu-
late the relative per capita uncompensated care expenditures in community
hospitals in Mississippi as compared to the rest of the country and the rela-
tive per capita medical expenditures in Mississippi to obtain the relative
value of expenditures other than Medicaid. The final component is to take
the average state share of hospital, physician, and drug payments and apply
this measure to the updated medical costs assessments presented in Table
1 to determine the Mississippi state share of that cost.
Workers in ill health may suffer higher sick leave costs. These costs were
relatively minor for the nation as a whole- about $.01 per pack-and are
considerably less for the state of Mississippi. To make these estimates spe-
cific to the state of Mississippi, the calculations reflected the relative earn-
ings of Mississippi workers relative to the U.S. average, the percentage of
the labor force employed by the state, and the average state share of sick
leave costs per employee.
In the case of group life insurance, there is no information available to
make separate estimates for the state of Mississippi as opposed to the aver-
age state. This calculation consequently simply divides the life insurance
costs proportionally among federal employees, state employees, and other
employee groups based on their employment share.
Nursing home costs are one of the most important external costs associ-
ated with cigarettes. However, this category represents a cost savings, not
a cost imposition. The starting point for this calculation is to reflect the av-
erage state burden of nursing home care costs, which is 33 percent. One
can then adjust this amount to reflect factors specific to the state of Missis-
sippi. In particular, the estimates adjust for the relative percentage of the
Mississippi population in nursing homes, which is only 86 percent of the
national average. The cost of nursing home care is also less than the na-
tional average as measured by covered charges per day. Finally, the calcula-
tions reflect the Medicaid share paid for by the state of Mississippi as a
proportion of that paid by the average state.
The largest component in the total societal externality costs is pension
costs. To calculate the Mississippi pension cost savings because of smok-
ers' premature mortality, one first assesses the proportion of pension pay-
ments paid by each level of government and by the private sector. The ad-
justment relative to the average state consists of two parts. First, many
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states supplement federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments.
Mississippi does not. As a result, one must assess the gross state pension
expenditures to reflect the omission of SSI payments from total costs. The
second adjustment is to correct for differences in the average state pension
payment per recipient. The net result of the pension cost savings of -$.04
to -$.05 per pack for the state of Mississippi depends on the particular as-
sumptions used. This amount is a small fraction of the total societal pension
cost savings.
The taxes on earnings reflect direct state employee payments into the sys-
tem to cover costs of health care, sick leave, group life insurance, and pen-
sions. The starting point for the calculations consists of the state employee's
hourly benefit cost. One then can adjust these amounts by the relative bene-
fits for the state of Mississippi taking into account all different components
of workers' pretax contributions.
Other components of the insurance externalities are of interest as well.
In the case without tar adjustments, total medical care costs are $.02 per
pack, whereas nursing home cost savings are -$.03 per pack. Thus, even
within the medical component alone there is no net cost imposition if one
includes both medical care and nursing home care in the calculations. In
addition, the retirement pension cost offset exceeds the cost associated with
medical care.
On balance, cigarettes are self-financing for Mississippi (see Table 2).
Whereas the cost savings generated by cigarettes were substantial for soci-
ety as a whole, for the state of Mississippi these savings only averaged
-$.03 per pack. The results for the state of Mississippi and other states are,
however, sensitive to the rate of discount. Cost savings from smoking in-
crease if there is no discounting, and cigarettes are a break-even proposition
at a 5 percent rate. These results paralleled those for other states. Note that
these estimates do not reflect the role of excise taxes in the state of Missis-
sippi, which are $.18 per pack.
V. OVERALL FEDERAL COSTS AND EFFECTS BY STATE
A. Federal and Average State Externalities
The state of Mississippi is unrepresentative in a variety of ways, chiefly
because of the lower per capita income and the consequences this has for
the structure of state programs and the demands on them. As a result, it is
useful to assess the costs for an average state and to distinguish the costs
for the federal government as well. Table 3 presents the three sets of such
calculations for both the federal costs and the state costs. As before, one
assumes that health effects are invariant to the tar level, a second set recog-
HeinOnline  -- 42 J.L. & Econ. 599 1999
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
TABLE 3
GOVERNMENTAL BURDEN OF INSURANCE EXTERNALITIES
(Cost per Pack)
REAL RATE OF INTEREST
State Cost Estimate Federal Cost Estimate
0% 3% 5% 0% 3% 5%




























.0427 .0329 .0302 .3063 .2357 .2166
.0000 .0012 .0019 .0000 .0010 .0015
.0096 .0054 .0036 .0076 .0043 .0029
-. 2063 -. 0779 -. 0261 -. 3833 -. 1448 -. 0485
-. 1885 -. 0779 -. 0239 -2.0480 -. 8465 -. 2593
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
.0584 .0266 .0081 .4856 .2213 .0671
-. 2841 -. 0897 -. 0062 -1.6318 -. 5290 -. 0198
.0359 .0272 .0248 .2575 .1952 .1776
.0003 .0011 .0017 .0002 .0009 .0013
.0080 .0045 .0030 .0064 .0036 .0024
-. 1790 -. 0676 -. 0227 -. 3327 -. 1257 -. 0421
-. 1580 -. 0653 -. 0200 -1.7168 -. 7096 -. 2174
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
.0472 .0215 .0065 .3931 .1791 .0543
-. 2456 -. 0786 -. 0066 -1.3922 -. 4565 -. 0238
.0290 .0217 .0196 .2076 .1553 .1402
.0003 .0013 .0020 .0003 .0010 .0016
.0064 .0036 .0024 .0051 .0029 .0019
-. 1112 -. 0420 -. 0141 -. 2066 -. 0780 -. 0262
-. 1582 -. 0654 -. 0200 -1.7189 -. 7105 -. 2176
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
.0587 .0267 .0081 .4884 .2225 .0675
-. 1750 -. 0541 -. 0020 -1.2241 -. 4067 -. 0326
nizes changes in tar content, and a third set updates an earlier analysis.51 For
both the federal and state government, the costs due to fires are assumed to
be zero since these are largely private costs.
The cost effects are similar for both the unadjusted estimates as well as
those that reflect tar adjustments. Because of the similarity, I will focus on
the tar-adjusted estimates, which reflect somewhat smaller cost savings. The
total federal cost savings are -$.46 per pack, whereas the total state cost
600
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savings are -$.08 per pack. This average state cost savings amount is more
than double the cost savings for Mississippi because the greater affluence
of these other states largely has the effect of scaling up the benefits and the
cost savings involved.
Cigarettes impose $.20 per pack of medical care costs on the federal gov-
emnment, as compared to $.03 per pack for the average state. Sick leave
costs and group life insurance are relatively small effects. The nursing
home care cost savings are -$.13 per pack for the federal government and
-$.07 per pack for state governments. As expected, federal retirement
pension savings from smokers' early mortality equal to -$.71 exceed
the -$.07 per pack value for the states. Taxes on earnings are similarly
scaled higher for the federal government than for the states, as one would
expect.
There are some differences in the composition of the cost with respect to
the cost offsets. Whereas the nursing home care cost savings to the states
exceeds the total medical care cost increase, this is not the case for the fed-
eral government. In each instance, however, the retirement pension cost
savings exceed the medical care cost increase. Moreover, the $.327 average
excise tax for the states and the $.24 excise tax for the federal government
each exceed the higher value of medical costs.
These estimates of the cost savings are, however, sensitive to the dis-
count rate. Cigarettes are self-financing at the federal level for all rates
shown in Table 3, with cost savings ranging from -$.02 per pack at 5 per-
cent interest to -$1.39 at 0 percent. For all states the cost savings range is
much narrower-from -$.01 at 5 percent interest to -$.25 at 0 percent.
Nevertheless, the self-financing status holds true even without the inclusion
of excise taxes.
B. Summary of Effects by State
One can undertake a similar set of calculations as was undertaken for
Mississippi for each state. These values appear in Table 4, where for sim-
plicity, I have summarized only the most salient cost components and the
total effects for the no-tar-adjustment case. Column 1 summarizes the state
excise tax rate for each of the states as well as for the nation as a whole.
The next series of five columns presents the principal cost components for
the externality costs per pack for the scenario in which costs are invariant
to the tar level. The final column presents the net cost per pack for the tar-
adjusted case.
The implications of Table 4 are quite dramatic. In every case, the excise
tax level roughly equals or exceeds the medical care cost per pack.
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TABLE 4
STATE CIGARETTE SMOKING EXTERNALITIES
NET EXTERNAL COSTS PER PACK
STATE EXCISE (Costs Invariant to Tar Level Case)
TAX RATE
(Dollars Medical Nursing Taxes on
STATE per Pack) Care Homes Pensions Earnings Total
Alabama .165 .02453 -.04361 -.07506 .01864 -.06902
Alaska .290 .03518 -.03766 -. 13640 .02129 -.11063
Arizona .580 .01179 -.04719 -.09375 .01547 -.10714
Arkansas .315 .02565 -. 06886 -. 05701 .01892 -. 07485
California .370 .03313 -. 11221 -. 13198 .02078 -. 18324
Colorado .200 .02762 - .09692 -. 10384 .01941 -. 14688
Connecticut .500 .05209 -.10256 -.12893 .02550 -.14693
Delaware .240 .03985 -. 08140 -. 06521 .02245 -. 07773
Florida .339 .03108 -. 08608 -. 06251 .02027 -. 09078
Georgia .120 .03123 -.05047 -.08863 .02031 -. 08115
Hawaii .600 .02729 -. 04695 -.09712 .01933 -.09082
Idaho .280 .01822 -. 04656 -.04625 .01707 -. 05101
Illinois .440 .03933 -. 12038 -. 07040 .02232 -. 12246
Indiana .155 .03201 -.09534 -.04805 .02050 -.08428
Iowa .360 .02599 -.16245 -.03123 .01901 -.14190
Kansas .240 .02508 -. 14260 -. 03448 .01878 -.12676
Kentucky .030 .02925 -. 05065 -. 07077 .01982 -. 06583
Louisiana .200 .03695 -. 11874 -. 03944 .02173 -. 09303
Maine .370 .03963 -.06823 -.07071 .02240 -. 07034
Maryland .360 .03650 -. 05986 -. 09520 .02162 -. 09023
Massachusetts .510 .04735 -. 11261 -. 09328 .02432 -. 12755
Michigan .750 .02935 -. 04724 -. 08216 .01984 -. 07331
Minnesota .480 .03702 -. 08937 -. 07461 .02175 -. 09833
Mississippi .180 .02011 -. 02851 -. 05129 .01754 -. 03577
Missouri .170 .02896 -.14337 -.06757 .01975 -.15583
Montana .180 .02234 -.05199 -.05882 .01810 -.06386
Nebraska .340 .02765 -. 11348 -.03637 .01942 -. 09634
Nevada .350 .02535 -.05229 -.08389 .01885 -.08527
New Hampshire .250 .03463 -. 11980 -.05503 .02115 -. 11248
New Jersey .400 .04619 -. 06737 -. 09772 .02403 -. 08798
New Mexico .210 .02240 -. 03397 -. 07920 .01811 -. 06617
New York .560 .08189 -. 06644 -. 09115 .03290 -. 03589
North Carolina .050 .02774 -. 04512 -. 07331 .01944 -. 06469
North Dakota .440 .02863 -. 05787 -. 04698 .01966 -. 05009
Ohio .240 .03434 -.08607 -.07965 .02108 -. 10361
Oklahoma .230 .02344 -. 11812 -. 09039 .01837 -. 16031
Oregon .380 .02404 -. 07009 -.05850 .01852 -.07937
Pennsylvania .310 .03191 -. 10222 -. 06512 .02048 -. 10826
Rhode Island .610 .05575 -. 08175 -. 12990 .02640 -. 12275
South Carolina .070 .02467 -. 03540 -. 07522 .01868 -. 06085
South Dakota .330 .02507 -. 08428 -. 04267 .01878 -. 07666
Tennessee .130 .03111 -.05795 -.04708 .02028 -. 04720
Texas .410 .02861 -.07988 -.03772 .01966 -.06281
Utah .265 .01568 -.03218 -.06727 .01644 -. 06091
Vermont .440 .03120 -.06365 -.06379 .02030 -.06933
Virginia .025 .02759 -. 06953 -. 07268 .01940 -. 08873
Washington .815 .02920 -. 09506 -. 03714 .01980 -. 07647
West Virginia .170 .03225 -. 04889 -. 05195 .02056 -. 04169
Wisconsin .440 .02896 -. 08850 -. 10225 .01974 -. 13510
Wyoming .120 .02301 -.06471 -.05265 .01826 -.06969
Averages .320 .03420 -. 08264 -. 07533 .02105 -. 09608
NOTE.-All figures assume a 3% discount rate. These average statistics are weighted by the packs of
cigarettes sold per state rather than a simple average, which is the approach used for the averages in
Table 3.
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Moreover, even excluding excise taxes, the total net external cost per pack
is always negative. Indeed, even if one only looks at the medical care and
nursing home components, from the standpoint of these two medical-related
effects, cigarettes are self-financing in almost every instance.
As is evident from Table 4, the medical care costs per pack are somewhat
less for Mississippi than for other states, and the pension cost savings and
the nursing home cost savings are lower as well. On balance, the net costs
per pack of cigarettes in the state of Mississippi represent a -$.04 per pack
cost savings. This amount ties for being the lowest net cost savings per pack
for any state in the table. It is consequently not surprising that the Missis-
sippi lawsuit to recoup the externality costs was the initial state litigation
effort.
Because of the substantial heterogeneity across states, the net conse-
quences of cigarettes for the states differ substantially. The average net cost
savings is -$.10 per pack, but this value ranges from a low of -$.04 per
pack in the state of Mississippi to a high value of -$.18 per pack in the
state of California.
It is useful to consider some extreme states in this table. Virginia has the
lowest excise tax rate, which is $.025 per pack. However, even this low
level of excise tax roughly equals the state's smoking-related medical care
costs. Moreover, the nursing home cost savings associated with smoking
are over double the value of the medical care cost increases. On balance,
cigarettes save the state of Virginia $.09 per pack as well as the value of
the excise taxes.
Another extreme case is that of New York. That state has the highest
value of medical care costs associated with smoking, which are $.08 per
pack. Nevertheless, the nursing home cost savings offset is almost as great
as this amount. Moreover, even for the state of New York, there is a net
insurance cost savings of cigarettes of -$.04 per pack. The medical cost
amounts are also dwarfed by the value of the state excise taxes imposed on
cigarettes in New York, which are $.56 per pack.
The final settlement specified the share of the payments that each state
would receive. How well did each of the 46 states participating in the agree-
ment fare relative to smoking costs? Table 5 lists the fraction of total medi-
cal costs per pack based on the amount of cigarette packs sold in the state
in 1997 and the state medical costs per pack from Table 4. The second col-
umn in Table 5 lists the specified state fractional share of the payments as
specified in the settlement, and the final column lists the ratio of the medical
cost share to the settlement share. States that fared above average included
California and Hawaii, which may reflect in part the retirement of smokers
to these states. The states where the smoker bought the cigarettes may not
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TABLE 5
RATIO OF SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS TO MEDICAL CARE
EXTERNALITIES AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES
Payment
Medical per Dollar
Cost Share of Medical
State Share Settlement Loss
Alabama .01523 .01646 1.08019
Alaska .00275 .00348 1.26273
Arizona .00527 .01501 2.85002
Arkansas .01018 .00843 .82829
California .08551 .12997 1.51989
Colorado .01229 .01396 1.13588
Connecticut .01948 .01890 .97029
Delaware .00513 .00403 .78425
Georgia .03154 .02499 .79240
Hawaii .00212 .00613 2.88591
Idaho .00229 .00370 1.61504
Illinois .05609 .04739 .84486
Indiana .03587 .02077 .57901
Iowa .00983 .00886 .90065
Kansas .00830 .00849 1.02278
Kentucky .02806 .01793 .63919
Louisiana .02424 .02296 .94743
Maine .00724 .00783 1.08167
Maryland .02048 .02302 1.12412
Massachusetts .03170 .04113 1.29740
Michigan .03326 .04431 1.33243
Missouri .02722 .02316 .85096
Montana .00244 .00432 1.77439
Nebraska .00569 .00606 1.06547
Nevada .00521 .00621 1.19131
New Hampshire .00894 .00678 .75858
New Jersey .04262 .03937 .92390
New Mexico .00351 .00607 1.72875
New York .15170 .12995 .85662
North Carolina .03491 .02375 .68025
North Dakota .00211 .00373 1.76418
Ohio .06148 .05129 .83426
Oklahoma .01199 .01055 .87998
Oregon .01003 .01169 1.16483
Pennsylvania .05298 .05853 1.10479
Rhode Island .00736 .00732 .99464
South Carolina .01422 .01198 .84228
South Dakota .00256 .00355 1.38871
Tennessee .02874 .02485 .86467
Utah .00220 .00453 2.05826
Vermont .00321 .00419 1.30605
Virginia .02766 .02082 .75274
Washington .01498 .02091 1.39594
West Virginia .00978 .00903 .92315
Wisconsin .01983 .02110 1.06420
Wyoming .00178 .00253 1.42021
NOTE.-Medical cost externality figures assume a 3% discount rate. Florida, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, and Texas did not participate in the settlement.
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always be the states where the medical expenses are incurred. The most
prominent state pushing for the national settlement was Washington, which
reaped a payment of $1.40 per dollar of medical costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state and federal breakdown of the financial consequences of ciga-
rette smoking does not simply involve scaling down the national estimates.
The distribution of the effects across different cost categories is not sym-
metric. States, for example, receive over half of the excise taxes associated
with cigarettes on average. However, states also receive only a small frac-
tion of the total decrease in pension costs associated with smokers' prema-
ture mortality.
The striking economic result is that cigarettes are self-financing when
viewed from a variety of insurance cost perspectives. Nursing home cost
savings resulting from smokers' early mortality typically exceed the in-
crease in medical costs. Similarly, pension cost savings associated with
smokers' premature mortality exceed the increase in medical costs. Finally,
excise taxes on cigarettes equal or exceed the medical care costs associated
with smoking. At the time smokers purchase cigarettes, they are paying an
excise tax fee that fully covers the adverse state medical insurance conse-
quences of their smoking behavior.
The analysis also indicated that the net gains to the federal government
from cigarette smoking are greater than to the states. This result illuminates
one potential reason why the federal government was not a party to the ini-
tial lawsuits against the cigarette industry. In addition to the excise taxes
received by the federal government, the nursing home and pension cost sav-
ings fully offset the increase in medical costs. However, the driving force
of the state suits and the out-of-court settlement was gross medical costs,
not net financial externalities. From that standpoint, the stakes of the pro-
spective federal lawsuit are considerably greater.
One puzzle raised by these results is why the cigarette companies would
settle such suits rather than litigate them. Whether the industry would have
won such suits would have depended on which costs counted and which
did not. In many but not all jurisdictions, preliminary rulings excluded rec-
ognition of excise taxes and the cost implications of smokers' premature
mortality. Making the cost savings argument based on the early death of
the product's consumers also is an uncomfortable argument for any industry
to make, even if the courts permit this approach. Moreover, if such argu-
ments are unsuccessful, the threat of punitive damages could boost the costs
well beyond the settlement amount.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES FOR ANALYSIS
The update of the author's earlier analysis from 1993 prices to 1995 prices fol-
lows a procedure identical to that described in the earlier paper.52 The only differ-
ence is that more recent data were used. The focus of this Appendix will be to
summarize the data sources used to develop the state-specific smoking externality
estimates.
A. Medical Expenditures
Information on the matching fund rates came from the Medicaid Bureau, Health
Care Financing Administration.53 Information on the percent of state residents re-
ceiving Medicaid was from the Health Care Financing Administration.' Medical
care data on the cost per recipient came from the same source.5 Total dollar
amounts of per capita uncompensated care in community hospitals were from the
American Hospital Association. 6 Population estimates for converting to per capita
figures were from the Population Distribution Branch, U.S. Bureau of the Census.5
Information on state medical expenditures and population figures came from multi-
ple sources." The percentage of other state medical expenditures on community
hospitals was derived from data published in a national heath care journal. 9 The
percentage of state spending on hospitals, physicians, and drugs other than Medic-




Sick leave costs estimates were assumed to be proportional to the number of em-
ployees and their earnings. Information on average state employee earnings came
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.61 The federal and local employee data came
52 See Viscusi, supra note 2.
5 See Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care State Rankings 1995, at 287.
Health Care Financing Administration, Eligibles, Recipients, Payments and Services
(HCFA-2082), as reported in id. at 286.
55 Id. at 284.
56 American Hospital Association, 1992 Annual Survey, as reported in Sourcebook of
Health Insurance Data: 1995, at 105.
51 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Distribution Branch, Estimates of the Civilian
Population of States: July 1, 1990, to July 1, 1995, on-line at www.census.gov/population/
estimates/state/st95cts.txt.
58 Health Care Financing Administration, supra note 53, at 255; and U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, at 319.
5' National Health Expenditures, 1993, 15 Health Care Financing Rev. 292 (Fall 1994).
60 Id. at 291.
61 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Employment, as reported in U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, supra note 58, at 323.
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from the same source.62 The sick leave cost for employees came from a U.S. De-
partment of Labor journal.63
C. Group Life Insurance
The analysis of group life insurance assumed that these costs were proportional
to the size of the labor force, with no additional adjustments. Employment data
came from the sources cited above.
D. Nursing Homes
Data on nursing home costs reflected a variety of adjustments from Mississippi
relative to the average U.S. state. Estimates of the percent of the population in nurs-
ing homes came from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.' Information on the cover
charges per day came from the Bureau of Data Management and Strategy. 6 Infor-
mation used to calculate the average state and federal burden for nursing home care
came from a national periodical.'
E. Pensions
The average state pension cost is calculated as the proportion of pension pay-
ments paid for the state, including state supplements to federal SSI benefits. Missis-
sippi does not supplement these benefits. Social Security and SSI payment data
came from the Social Security Administration. 6 The federal employee pension
costs came from the Employee Benefit Research Institute.' Information on state
SSI supplementation came from the Social Security Administration.69 State em-
ployee pension costs came from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.7° That same source
was used for local employees. Private pension costs were obtained from the U.S.
Department of Labor.7' Finally, average state pension payments per recipient were
obtained from the Council on State Governments.72
62 Id. at 319, 323.
63 Cost of Employee Compensation in Public and Private Sectors, Monthly Lab. Rev. 15
(May 1993).
' U.S. Bureau of the Census, Nursing Home Population 1990 (CPH-L-137), as reported
in Health Care Financing Administration, supra note 53, at 215.
65 Bureau of Data Management and Strategy, Health Care Financing Administration, as
reported in Universal Health Care Almanac, 1995, table 9.5.2.
1 National Health Expenditures, supra note 59, at 291.
67 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement: 1994, Social Security
Bull. (1994).
' Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits (3d ed.
1995).
69 Social Security Administration, supra note 67, at 292.
70 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Finances of Employee Retirement Systems of State and Lo-
cal Governments, Series GF, No. 2 (1996).
"' U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Private Pen-
sion Plan Bull. (Summer 1993).
72 Council on State Governments, The Book of the States, 1994-1995, at 466 (1994).
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F. Taxes on Earnings
The earnings taxes reflect direct state employee payments into the system to
cover health care sick leave, pension, and life insurance costs. State and local gov-
ernment employee hourly benefit cost data are from a national periodical.73 Other
components needed to calculate taxes, such as relative amounts of medical care in
the state in relation to the national average, were based on calculations from previ-
ous stages in the analysis.
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